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Investments in technology have the potential to improve lives and organizations and can 
be force multipliers for an organization, however federal IT projects too often experience 
cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls. Specific to the Coast 
Guard, there are currently four Information Technology Level 1 acquisitions programs 
that have life-cycle costs estimates equal to or greater than $1-billion.  Many of these 
projects are over budget, and as a result, many of the desired capabilities will not make it 
to the end user. 
Since the passage of the first Acquisition Act and every acquisition mandate 
since, the federal government has struggled to deliver capabilities that have met the 
requirements of the end-user, while staying within budget, on schedule and within cost.  
To alleviate this, adding more mandates and oversight has become the “go to play.”  
However, these mandates just might be having the antithesis effect on desired outcomes.  
This thesis describes alternative system development methodologies that could assist 
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense in maximizing the 
delivery of capabilities to the end-user, while staying on schedule and within budget. 
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The philosopher Hegel hypothesized that increased human understanding 
follows a path of thesis (this is why things happen the way they do); 
antithesis (the thesis fails in some important ways; here is a better 
explanation); and synthesis (the antithesis rejected too much of the 
original thesis; here is a hybrid that captures the best of both while 
avoiding their defects). (Boehm, 2006) 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem is that U.S. Coast Guard information technology (IT) projects are 
often delivered late, over budget, and not within the scope of the original requirements.  
Additionally, when these IT projects are delivered, they are often obsolete because the 
technology specified in the original acquisition requirements has a very short life cycle.  
This is a problem because failing to successfully deliver these IT capabilities hampers the 
Coast Guard’s ability to accomplish its three primary responsibilities of maritime safety, 
maritime security, and maritime stewardship.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore and understand the factors that may have 
contributed to Coast Guard IT projects that have been delivered late and/or out of scope 
or that are over budget.  This study seeks an understanding of the nature and 
characteristics of failed IT projects.  These failures are in the context of a plethora of 
resources made available to the Coast Guard to ensure the success of its IT projects.  This 
study is important because it could identify several areas where progress might be made 
in improving the rate at which Coast Guard Command, Control, Computers, 
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technology 
can be assessed, acquired, implemented, and sustained. 
 
 xviii 




Investments in technology have the potential to improve organizations and can be 
force multipliers.  However, federal IT projects too often experience cost overruns, 
schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls. Specific to the Coast Guard, there are 
currently four information technology command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) Level 1 acquisitions programs, 
which are outlined in the Major Systems Acquisition Manual as having life-cycle cost 
estimates equal to or greater than $1 billion.  As stated in a September 2012 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, these major C4ISR programs are 86 percent over 
budget and current funding levels will not allow the programs to execute as planned 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2012).  Additionally, outdated program 
baselines do not reflect current costs or schedules of the programs for myriad reasons, 
which results in the Coast Guard not being able to provide Congress with accurate 
information in its capital investment plan.   
Since the passage of the first acquisition act, and in every acquisition mandate 
since, the federal government has struggled to deliver capabilities that have met the 
requirements of the end user while staying within budget and on schedule.  To alleviate 
this challenge, adding more mandates and oversight has become the “go-to play.”  These 
policies and mandates, however, just might be creating a phenomenon that Senge (1990) 
called compensating feedback, which is “when well-intentioned interventions call forth 
responses from the system that offset the benefits of the intervention” (p. 58), meaning 
that the additional regulatory requirements are having a counterproductive effect on the 
desired outcomes. Regardless, improvements must be made, and this thesis explores a 
viable option for improvement.  
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I of this thesis described the context surrounding the current state of 
investments in technology and C4IT capabilities within the Coast Guard. Chapter II 
describes agile software development and provides a glimpse into the current 
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fundamental application of this methodology. Chapter III provides a detailed look at both 
the WatchKeeper project and the Mission and Asset Scheduling Interface (MASI) 
project, two IT projects that I was personally involved with, and the outcomes of those 
projects. The goal of Chapter III is to provide a glimpse into the challenges that are 
present when fielding C4IT systems. Chapter IV discusses the challenge of information 
from federal-level policies and directions, as well as internal Coast Guard policies and 
direction. Chapter V presents potential considerations for future C4IT development 
endeavors. 
B. MOTIVATION 
I am convinced that the Coast Guard can become more efficient and effective at 
fielding capabilities for operators to be better positioned to complete their mission.  Being 
involved with both the WatchKeeper project and the MASI project, I have witnessed 
firsthand successful outcomes to IT project management challenges—when the effort is 
freed of bureaucratic mandates that have little to no value. I am also convinced that the 
Coast Guard possesses enough indigenous talent to accomplish fielding useful systems 
for our operators.    
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Introduction 
• What is the problem and purpose of the thesis?  Agile development 
• What is it?  
• What are the different types?  
• What are the strengths and weaknesses? 
• When is it appropriate to apply the methodology?  
• What are the comparisons with traditional engineering approaches?  
2. WatchKeeper and MASI IT systems 
• What is the WatchKeeper project, and what were the goals and objectives 
of the project?  
• How was the WatchKeeper project managed? 
• What was the outcome of the WatchKeeper project?  
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• What is the MASI project, and what were the goal and objectives of the 
project?  
• How was the MASI project managed?  
• What was the outcome of the MASI project?  
3. Analysis of the WatchKeeper and MASI projects 
4. Recommendations 
 4 
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II. WHAT IS AGILE? 
Agile software development is an approach that developers use to plan, 
coordinate, work, and communicate with customers, stakeholders, etc.  In its most 
simplistic form, agile software development is about “feedback and change” (Dingsøyr, 
Dyba, & Moe, 2010).  Cockburn (2006) also stated that by accepting that perfect 
communication is not feasible, one can learn to manage that uncertainty and “stop when 
you have sufficiently communicated to the purpose of the intended audience” (p. 1).  
Boehm and Turner (2004) defined agile as both the ability to rapidly change and the 
counterpart to discipline: discipline strengthens; agility releases and invents.  A textbook 
definition of agile development states that when there are uncertainties with development 
or problems occur, agile provides procedures for allowing for flexibility to be responsive 
to unanticipated issues (Burd, Jackson, & Satzinger, 2012). Erickson, Lyytinen, and Siau 
(2005) defined agility as the “means for stripping away the heaviness, commonly 
associated with traditional software development methods, to promote quick response to 
changing environments” (p. 2). These definitions don’t necessarily solidify an exact 
answer to what agile software development is; however, the definitions share some 
similar  terminologies, such as communication, uncertainty, volatile environments, and 
flexibility—all of which are derived from the Manifesto for Agile Software Development 
(Beck et al., 2001).  
A. MANIFESTO FOR AGILE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
In February 2001, 17 people met in Utah and developed what is commonly known 
as the Manifesto for Agile Software Development (the Manifesto). The Manifesto 
describes what the group feels is “the uncovering of better ways to developing software” 
(Beck et al., 2001).  The Manifesto has 12 principles:  
1. Satisfy the customer through early and continuous delivery of valuable 
software: The highest priority of the team is to satisfy the customer 
with frequent deliveries that allow for early feedback with respect to 
the requirements, the team, and the process. 
2. Harness change for competitive advantage: If the team can adapt to the 
changing requirements (because of early, frequent delivery), this 
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allows for a response to late-breaking information that often allows a 
company to outmaneuver a competitor. 
3. Deliver working software frequently: This reinforces the importance of 
delivering working software frequently. 
4. Business people and developers work together daily: This principle 
enforces the concept that daily interaction helps to facilitate better 
communication. 
5. Build projects around motivating people: This principle focuses on the 
people aspect of the project more than on the process. 
6. Face-to-face conversation is the most effective and efficient way to 
convey information: This principle supports number 4, with the 
addition of the importance of face-to-face communication—the most 
efficient and effective approach for conveying information. 
7. Working software is the primary measure of progress: This is the 
Manifesto’s third reference to the delivery of working software. It 
reinforces software delivery as a primary goal of a software 
development project. 
8. Agile processes promote sustainable development: This principle 
focuses on the nonlinearity of humans and suggests that as people put 
in long hours, they begin to tire and the rate of progress of the project 
slows 
9. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design enhances 
agility: This principle focuses on a well-encapsulated design, which 
facilitates greater agility and an ability to change. In order to 
accomplish this, the team should produce good designs throughout the 
project. 
10. Simplicity is the art of maximizing work done: Simplicity is essential. 
As Cockburn (2002) stated, “Simplicity has to do with accomplishing 
while not doing, maximizing the work not done while producing good 
software” (p. 212).  
11. The best architecture, requirements, and design emerge from self-
organizing teams: The focus here is on the architecture being allowed 
to adjust over time, just as the requirements do. 
12. Adjust and fine tune the development process to become more 
effective at delivering useful code in intervals: This principle reaffirms 
that the most important aspect of the software development project is 
the delivery of working software. 
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The four core values gleaned from the Manifesto and that are at the core of agile system 
development are the following  
1. individuals and interactions over processes and tools, 
2. working software over comprehensive documentation,  
3. customer collaboration over contract negotiation, and  
4. responding to change over following a plan.  
B. GENERAL GUIDELINES TO AGILE (BASIC THEORIES) 
The idea of agile development is that it is more important to place emphasis on 
the people in the project than on the documentation.  Amicability, talent, skill, and 
communication become the foundation of the team, and the development of these skills is 
of utmost importance (Cockburn & Highsmith, 2001b).  The idea is that by strengthening 
these areas, the cost of moving information and quickening the decision-making sequence 
is realized, ultimately making the team more flexible.  By placing people physically 
closer and replacing documents with in-person communication, the cost of moving 
information can be greatly reduced; likewise, adding experts to the team and working 
incrementally quickens the feedback loop, thus reducing the time that it takes to make a 
decision (Cockburn & Highsmith, 2001b).    
The fact that the business world has become turbulent, uncertain, and fast paced—
requiring fast responses—is why the term agile has been coined.  However, it is of the 
utmost importance not only to be fast, but to be accurate as well.  The agile process 
requires that appropriate business processes be in place to make and support change.  
However, in order for these processes to succeed, they must have responsive people and 
organizations.  Too often, software engineering and rigorous process adherents are 
incorrectly confused as competence (Cockburn & Highsmith, 2001a). As Cockburn and 
Highsmith (2001b) stated, “Processes do provide the framework for groups to work 
together, but processes alone cannot overcome a lack of competency.  However 
competency can surely overcome the vagaries of a process” (p. 132).   
Agile software development is a complex phenomenon that includes interrelated 
practices and managerial policies, so it might be best to try to examine agile software 
development from a theoretical perspective.  There are a variety of theories that best 
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explain agile development, but dynamic capabilities, coordination, and double-loop 
learning are the theories that work the best.  Dynamic capabilities theory helps explain 
the need for agility and how to achieve it.  Coordination and double-loop learning help 
explain how to best achieve coordination and learning in an agile environment 
(Balasubramaniam & Lan, 2007).  Agile manufacturing, which was introduced to help 
the United States regain competitive positioning in the manufacturing world, proves that 
agility is not unique to software development (Dingsøyr & Dybå, 2008). Manufacturing 
industries embraced agile to react quickly to changing customer requirements, and 
dynamic capabilities theory, as explained in strategic management literature 
(Balasubramaniam & Lan, 2007).  Pisano, Teece, and Teece (1997) stated, “Dynamic 
capabilities are the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments” (p. 515).  Dynamic capabilities 
theory explains how organizations can achieve competitive advantages while operating in 
a changing environment.  Dynamic capabilities theory exhibits several common features 
of agile development. These features include cross-functional teams, joint experiences 
among team members, and external communications.  Effective dynamic capabilities 
include the frequent use of prototyping to obtain real-time feedback in order to adjust 
actions and experimentations.  Applying dynamic capabilities theory to agile software 
development has been proven successful across multiple industries, suggesting merit to 
its application in appropriate dynamic environments.   
Coordination theory requires that the entire group working on the project share a 
common set of goals and share information to facilitate activities  (Kraut & Streeter, 
1995). As task interdependence becomes intensive, group coordination increases 
significantly and personal coordination increases moderately (Van De Ven, Delbecq, & 
Koenig, 1976).  As such, agile development involves intensive teamwork and high task 
interdependence, using group meetings and personal coordination.  As task 
interdependence increases, organizational hierarchy decreases, suggesting that agile 
development requires an increased use of organizational rules and routines 
(Balasubramaniam & Lan, 2007).  As uncertainty increases, tasks become more 
challenging and coordination is more difficult.  Therefore, the use of personal and group 
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coordination increases while the use of impersonal coordination decreases significantly.  
In an agile environment, where tasks are highly uncertain because of changing and/or 
incomplete requirements, personal and group modes of coordination are preferred over 
the use of formal documentation (Balasubramaniam & Lan, 2007).  As Balasubramaniam 
and Lan (2007) state, “Agile approaches replace heavy documentation, upfront design, 
detailed plans and formal contracts with feature based planning, evolving design and co-
located customers” (p. 46).  
Double-loop learning theory helps explain how to solve complex and ill-
structured problems in rapidly changing contexts.  Learning is critical in agile software 
development, as Highsmith (1997) states,   
In an adaptive environment, learning challenges stakeholders, including 
both developers and customers, to examine their assumptions, and then 
use the results of each development cycle to learn the direction of the next. 
The cycles need to be short, so teams can learn from small, rather than 
large mistakes. They also need to be double-looped, so teams learn both 
about product changes, fundamental changes, and underlying assumptions 
about how the products are being developed. (p. 45) 
Double-loop learning theory has three important elements:  
1. Governing variables are dimensions that people keep within. 
2. Action strategies are the plans used to keep governing variables within 
an acceptable range.  
3. Consequences are the results of those actions.  
In single-loop learning, when something goes wrong, workers try to look for 
another solution given the variables that are present.  In double-loop learning, however, 
people question the governing variables themselves and subject the variables to critical 
scrutiny.  As such, this is a shift in the way people frame strategies and consequences.  
Double-loop learning is more important for organizations operating in dynamic 
environments (Argyris & Schön, 1996).  See Figure 1 for details on single- and double-
loop learning.  
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Figure 1.  Single- and Double-Loop Learning (From Argyris & Schön, 1996) 
Agile software development practices foster double-loop learning because double-
loop learning provides an environment that warrants the participants to experiment with 
their mental models.  As Beck (2004) stated, “Agile software development is a 
continuously self-correcting process” (p. 46).  Instead of doing things right, the focus is 
on doing the right thing to enhance business value, frequently adjusting strategies and 
monitoring the feedback of those decisions.   
An aspect of agile development that is often missed is that organizations are 
complex, adaptive systems, where decentralized interaction is guided by a set of simple, 
generative rules (Cockburn & Highsmith, 2001b).  The previously mentioned 
organizational theories are tremendously important to help explain why agility is useful 
in software development.  The agile approach is consistent with these sound principles 
and is grounded in management and the organization theories explained previously 
(Balasubramaniam & Lan, 2007).   
C. AGILE DEVELOPMENT METHODS 
Agile software development methods are being adopted in all industries and fields 
to deal with quickly evolving requirements that can become obsolete before project 
completion (Balasubramaniam & Lan, 2007).  As Sengupta et al. (2013) stated: 
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Lightweight processes that employ short iterative cycles, actively involve 
users to establish prioritize, and verify requirements, and rely on a team’s 
tacit knowledge as opposed to documentation. True agile methods must 
take several cycles to complete, teams must determine the best way to 
handle work, and the work structures must be reorganized during the 
project rather than predetermined. (p. 2)   
There are multiple agile methodologies. To provide a scope for this thesis, I 
summarize six methods in this section: crystal methodologies, dynamic software 
development method (DSDM), feature-driven development, lean software development, 
scrum, and extreme programming (XP).  I do not intend for this section to describe these 
methodologies in great detail but rather to provide high-level exposure to each method’s 
core values and practices (Dingsøyr & Dybå, 2010). Methods/processes/models are not 
capitalized in APA (like laws and theories are not). 
1. Crystal Methodologies  
The core philosophy of this methodology is that software development requires 
cooperative invention and communication, with a primary goal of delivering useful 
working code.  A key to this philosophy is that projects need to be run differently based 
on needs and that the people involved must be as flexible as the needs.  Crystal is a 
method for co-located teams of different sizes and criticality, and each team is given a 
color based on the team’s size and the team’s talents.  These colors are clear, yellow, 
orange, red, magenta, and blue.  As shown in Figure 2, the clear team has the fewest 
members, while the blue team has the largest number of team members.  This is the most 
flexible of all the agile methods and critically focuses on communication and small teams 
(Cockburn, 2002).  Crystal development has seven characteristics:  
1. frequent delivery, 
2. reflective improvement, 
3. osmotic communication,  
4. personal safety, 
5. focus, 
6. easy access to experts, and 
7. requirements for the technical environment. .  
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Figure 2.  Agile Development Crystal Methodologies (From John Pruitt, 2011)  
Figure 2 describes the various categories of the crystal method, of which life has 
the highest priority and comfort has the lowest.  The colors represent the size of the team 
that is needed for the effort.  For example, an E-yellow project is a project that is 
essential and requires a team of 20 members, and a D-red project is a project that is 
discretionary and requires a 100-person team.   
2. Dynamic Software Development Method (DSDM)  
This methodology divides projects into three phases: pre-project, which focuses 
on candidate projects and funding; project life cycle, which examines the feasibility, 
design, and implementation of the project; and finally, the post-project, which ensures the 
system is operating effectively and efficiently.  Figure 3 provides a graphical 
representation of the DSDM.  The DSDM has nine principles:  
1. involving the user, 
2. empowering the project team, 
3. delivering frequently, 
4. addressing current business needs, 
5. using iterative and incremental development, 
6. allowing for revisions,  
7. fixing high-level scope before the project starts, 
8. testing throughout the project life cycle, and 
9. providing efficient and effective communication. 
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Figure 3.  Dynamic Development Software Method (From Clifton & Dunlop, 2003)  
3. Feature-Driven Development  
This methodology combines model-driven and agile development with an 
emphasis on an initial object model, division of work features, and iterative design for 
each feature.  It consists of five activities: develop overall model, build feature list, plan 
by feature, design by feature, and finally build by feature. Feature-driven development is 
driven from the customer’s perspective and is designed around industry best practices.  





Figure 4.  Feature-Driven Development (From Feature-Driven, n.d.) 
4. Lean Software Development  
This methodology is an adaptation of principles from lean production, in 
particular, the Toyota production system, to software development.  This methodology 
has seven principles:  
• eliminate waste, 
• amplify learning, 
• decide as late as possible, 
• deliver as fast as possible,  
• empower the team, 
• build integrity, and 
• see the whole. 
Figure 5 shows a graphical overview of this method.   
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Figure 5.  Lean Software Development (From Scio, 2010) 
5. Scrum  
This methodology focuses on project management in situations where it is 
difficult to plan ahead and where feedback loops constitute the core element of the 
process.  Software is developed by a team in increments that are called sprints, starting 
with planning and ending with review.  The implementation features are registered in a 
backlog, and the product owner decides which backlog items should be developed in the 
next sprint.  All of the software development activities (requirements analysis, design, 
coding, testing, and delivery) are carried out in each sprint (Suganya & Mary, 2010).  At 
the end of each sprint, the team is able to deliver a small portion of the product. Work is 
coordinated in daily stand-up meetings where the person in charge, called the scrum 
master, is responsible for solving problems.  These scrums define the framework to 
organize and produce products on time. The scrum master prioritizes the backlog, and 
then the scrum team prioritizes the customer requirements, taking into consideration both 
the customer needs and the business needs.  Figure 6 shows a graphical representation of 
a scrum and the tasks involved.  
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Figure 6.  Scrum Development (From Lynch, 2010) 
6. Extreme Programming (XP)  
This methodology is probably the most well-known agile process (Beck, 2000; 
Strigel, 2001). XP starts with a planning phase, followed by several iterations, and ends 
with acceptance testing. The work is broken up and prioritized by the end user. The key is 
that at the end of every iteration, the end user performs an acceptance test against the 
requirements, often referred to as user stories (Suganya & Mary, 2010).  See Figure 7 for 
a graphical depiction of the XP process.  XP focuses on best practices for development 
and consists of 13 common practices:  
• whole team, 
• customer test, 
• small releases, 
• planning game, 
• collective ownership, 
• coding standard, 
• continuous integration, 
• metaphor, 
• sustainable pace, 
• simple design, 
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• pair programming, 
• refectory, and 
• test-driven development.  
 
Figure 7.  Extreme Programming (From Extreme, 2000) 
Given the preceding examination of these agile methodologies, there are six 
features that are common to them all.  As Bohner and Coram (2005) stated, these features 
are as follows:   
1. Collaboration: Agile methods are highly collaborative inside and 
outside the development group. 
2. Code review: Agile methods encourage code reviews to facilitate the 
dissemination of key information. 
3. Small teams: Agile methods encourage small teams.  
4. Short release schedules: Agile release schedules can be as short as two 
weeks, which allows the team to evaluate the product and identify 
priorities.   
5. Boxing: Time boxing helps to focus the customer and reduces scope 
creep. The release length is fixed so that the features of the system are 
not. 
6. Constant testing: Frequent testing helps to prevent a degraded product. 
This helps to offset the risk of just writing the code. Testing must be 
automated with the daily builds and regression test to ensure that all 
functionality works. 
To support the theme of common characteristics, Glaiel, Moulton, and Madnick 
(2013) have found that regardless of the agile methodology employed, seven agile 
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techniques are common to all of the previously mentioned methodologies.  They call 
these seven agile techniques the “Genome of Agile,” and they are listed and described in 
Table 1 (Glaiel, Moulton, and Madnick, 2013).  
Table 1.   The Genome of Agile (From Glaiel et al., 2013) 
1. Gene 
Name 
2. Description 3. Contrast to 
Traditional 
 Story/Feature Driven  Breakup of the project into 
manageable pieces of 
functionality, sometimes named 
“features,” “stories,” “use 
cases,” or “threads.” The 
system is segmented into sets of 
client-valued functionality, and 
development work is organized 
around producing these 
features. 
 Traditionally employ 
functional decomposition 
where system is broken into 
subcomponents that are 
implemented in parallel and 
integrated in late stages. 
This requires upfront 
requirement specification in 
lockdown. 
 Iterative-Incremental  Development is performed in 
repeated cycles (iterative) and 
in portions at a time 
(incremental). 
 Development approaches 
call for complete 
requirements analysis 
phase, followed by lengthy 
design, coding, and test 
phases 
. Micro-Optimizing . This represents the adaptive 
nature of agile management 
processes. Agile methodologies 
are encouraged to tailor aspects 
of the development process to 
adapt to change. Teams are 
empowered to modify aspects 
of the process or dynamically 
adapt to changing 
circumstances. Small 
improvements and variable 
changes are made frequently as 
needed.  
. Traditional processes can 
exhibit a flavor of this 
change in the form of 
lessons learned activities 
that are called for at the 
completion of a project, but 
which really feed to the 
next development cycle and 
yield little improvement on 
subsequent development 
projects. 
. Refactoring . Refinement of the software 
design and architecture to 
improve software 
maintainability and flexibility. 
Several of the agile 
methodologies consider 
refactoring to be the primary 
. Typically traditional 
development schedules do 




2. Description 3. Contrast to 
Traditional 
development practice. 
Refactoring consists of taking 
apart existing working code, 
factoring out common 
elements, and rebuilding it to 
provide a stronger base for 
subsequent development. 
. Continuous Integration . Policies and practices related to 
configuration management, and 
software build and test 
automation. Continuous 
integration involves methods 
for maintaining an updated 
code base that includes all 
changes that have been made 
and regularly building a testable 
version of the product 
. Configuration management 
is traditionally approached 
by having different teams 
develop different portions 
of software in isolated 
environments.  They then 
try to integrate these 
separate portions later in 
the development cycle. 
. Team Dynamics . Soft factors related to the 
project team. Daily meetings, 
workspaces, pair programming, 
schedule/peer pressure, 
experience gained, etc.  
.  
. Customer Involvement . Customer/User involved in 
demonstrations of functionality 
to verify and validate features. 
Higher frequency feedback and 
clarification of uncertainty. 
Availability to participate in 
development meetings. 
Customer involvement gene 
means accepting changing 
requirements and including the 
user in the development to the 
degree that is possible. 
. The traditional approach to 
this is to lock in the system 
requirements early in the 
project.  Any subsequent 
changes require contractual 
renegotiation for added 
scope or scope change. 
The application of the genome of agile framework is dependent on the agile 
methodology used.  Not every agile method features every genome as identified by Glaiel 





Table 2.   Agile Genes Maps to Several Popular Agile Methodologies (From Glaiel et al., 2013) 
. Methodology 26. Agile Gene 












35. Scrum 36. X 37. X 38.  39. X 40. X 41. X 42.  
43. XP 44. X 45. X 46. X 47. X 48. X 49. X 50.  
51. TDD 52. X 53. X 54. X 55.  56.  57.  58. X 
59. FDD 60. X 61. X 62.  63.  64.  65.  66.  
67. Crystal 68. X 69. X 70.  71. X 72. X 73.  74.  
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D. ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPACTS 
1. Assumptions 
While there has been a lot of interest and enthusiasm behind agile methods, and 
most reviews have been favorable, specific assumptions are present in agile software 
development processes. These assumptions and development practices could lead to 
limitations. The following is a summary of the assumptions identified by Turk, France, 
and Rumpe (2005):  
1. Visibility assumption: This assumption suggests that working code can 
be used as a sole source for project visibility. Although project 
visibility is traditionally accomplished through various report 
specifications—and measures of quality and productivity—agile 
development suggests that working code is a true barometer for project 
status. 
2. Iteration assumption: This assumption states that a project can always 
be structured into short fixed-time iterations. As stated previously, 
agile processes require features to be coupled and bundled so they can 
be addressed in fixed-time iterations. 
3. Customer-interaction assumptions: This assumption suggests that the 
customer will always be available for interaction when needed by 
developers. This means that the customer can always reschedule their 
other work. 
4. Team-communication assumption: This assumption states that 
developers are located so that they are able to have frequent 
communication with each other, specifically face to face. This requires 
that team meetings be a priority and that this is accepted by all of the 
respective stakeholders.  
5. Face-to-face assumption: This assumption suggests that face-to-face 
interaction is the most productive method in communication. This 
assumption deemphasizes the value of documentation as a 
communication aid based on the idea that tacit knowledge is superior 
to other types of gained knowledge. There are potential ramifications 
for this assumption. As Boehm (2002) stated, “This focus on tacit 
knowledge makes projects that use agile process dependent upon 
experts” (p. 13). 
6. Documentation assumption: This assumption states that developing 
extensive documentation and software models is counterproductive. 
The assumption is that it is more reliable to determine design from 
actual code than from documents, specifically since documents are 
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rarely kept up to date and are not maintained when code is changed. 
Advocates for documentation state that documents provide good 
models to bring new hires up to speed, which helps users determine 
the applicability of requirements. 
7. Welcoming changing requirements: Requirements change during 
software development, and this is recognized both in the agile and 
traditional developmental communities. Evolving requirements are an 
inherent problem of software development; however, it is assumed that 
the development team will be able to handle changing requirements, 
even late in the game.  
8. Continuous redesign assumption: This assumption maintains that 
systems can continuously be redesigned while maintaining their 
conceptual integrity. The assumption is that the system can be 
redesigned and carried out without a significant amount of time and 
cost. 
9. Simplicity is essential: This assumption states that the complexity 
imposed by heavyweight processes and models is unnecessary. The 
assumption is that a focused architecture that satisfies the current 
needs is preferred to a general architecture that is designed to 
incorporate future needs. 
2. Impacts 
In addition to the assumptions underlying agile software development processes, 
there are impacts that may affect the project management component of the software 
development effort. I examine these impacts as they relate to people, processes, and 
projects and then summarize the findings of Bohner and Coram (2005). The impact of a 
software development process on people is obvious. The people involved include 
developers, customers, testers, executive management, and project leaders, to name a 
few. However, the largest impact is on the developers. As previously stated, agile 
methods are lightweight methods that do not follow strict guidelines and processes. As 
such, it is imperative that the developers be highly trained and willing to work as a team. 
Cockburn (2002) identified characteristics and three levels of skill that developers must 
have to accomplish various tasks within a given framework. Table 3 identifies these 
characteristics. 
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Table 3.   Levels of Software Understanding and Use (From Boehm & Turner, 2004) 
Level Characteristics  
3 Able to produce solutions and 
unprecedented situations 
2 Able to tailor solutions to fit new, but 
precedented situations 
1A Solid developer able to implement 
functionality, estimate effort, and re-
factor code 
1B Able to implement simple functionality, 
execute tests, and follow directions 
-1  Unwilling or unable to work in a 
collaborative environment 
Of the three different personal technical skills identified in Table 3, only levels 3, 
2, and 1A would possess the needed ability to work in an agile environment. Given the 
need to employ high levels of expertise, traditionally staffed organizations may have 
difficulties achieving this requirement. 
The impact of using agile methodology on an organization’s software 
development testing team is dependent on the developmental cycles of the agile process 
chosen. Testers must work closely with developers throughout the entire process and 
might actually need to be programmers themselves. The challenge to management is to 
be able to identify this required skill set of would-be team members. As a project leader 
in an agile development effort, the challenge is in assembling an experienced staff and 
empowering those members.  This empowerment might be a cultural shift for some 
organizations, which may dissect the decision-making hierarchy. Additionally, project 
leaders have to develop the skills required to respond to change. Project leaders have a 
much more hands-on role than in traditional development efforts, and as such, they are 
more involved with customer collaboration. 
Customers have a much more involved role with agile methods than with 
traditional development efforts. With agile, customers are involved throughout the entire 
process, unlike traditional development, where customers are involved only with defining 
the requirements and with acceptance testing. It is highly recommended that a full-time 
customer presence be on-site to work with the development team on a daily basis.  
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3. Process and Documentation Impacts 
Since agile methods require new process activities, many organizations must 
make drastic changes to old processes to accommodate the new way of doing business. 
This includes, but is not limited to, planning, documentation, development processes, and 
delivery. Agile processes place less importance on formal planning, but planning still 
needs to take place. Planning in agile is a relatively informal process, but there are so 
many small tests, which may lead to more planning needs. In most agile efforts, 
documentation is often limited to allow for optional architecture to be developed. The 
determination of how much documentation to use in an agile effort is critical, as is the 
understanding that documentation must be updated whenever a change is made. Although 
this type of documentation effort can avoid the wasted time of writing a document and 
then leaving it to become obsolete, it does come with risk.  As stated earlier, 
documentation is an excellent way to bring new hires up to speed with the developmental 
effort, and it provides a method for tracking and auditing.    
4. Comparison to Traditional Engineering Methods (Plan Driven)  
As stated previously, the primary goals of agile methods are rapid value and 
responsiveness to change, while the primary goals of plan-driven methods are 
predictability, stability, and high assurance. Agile approaches are based on the view that 
organizations are complex adaptive systems, where requirements are emergent rather 
than pre-specifiable (Boehm & Turner, 2004).  Plan-driven goals are focused on 
increasing process capability for standardization, measurement, and control.  Agile 
projects focus on building things quickly and finding out through experience what 
activity or feature will add the most value (Boehm & Turner, 2004).  Agile 
methodologies are reactive postures that have considerable advantages when operating in 
an environment with rapid changes, such as technology. However, the downside to this 
approach is the overemphasis on tactical objectives over strategic objectives.   
Current research has stated that agile processes work best within small to medium 
groups working on relatively small applications (Boehm & Turner, 2004). Kent Beck 
(2004) stated, “The size of the project clearly matters, and it would very difficult to run a 
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project using agile methods with a team of 100 programmers or more” (p. 38). Larger 
agile projects with hundreds of people have been successful, but in those cases, 
traditional plans and specifications were adopted to deal with interactions among the 
project elements. Conversely, plan-driven methods are better for larger projects, where 
plans, documentation, and processes provide for better communication.  As stated 
previously, agile methods concentrate on delivering a product on time to satisfy the 
customer. However, this comes with an inherent risk of microscopically focusing on the 
product at hand and ignoring problems that may occur later. An example of this pitfall is 
developing an agile system or application that doesn’t integrate well with the 
organization’s overall enterprise architecture.  
When agile approaches are compared to traditional approaches from a managerial 
perspective, there are discrete differences in each stakeholder’s expectations. Although 
planning, control, and communications are prevalent in both approaches, they are 
managed differently. Agile approaches depend on dedicated customer involvement 
focused on adding rapid value to the effort. Conversely, plan-driven methods depend on a 
formal contract between the developers and customers as the basis for customer relations. 
This contract is designed to identify foreseeable problems in advance and formalize a 
solution with documentation.  Although this approach aids in identifying potential issues, 
it can be a high stress point for the development team working to facilitate the plan-
driven effort. With agile, planning is seen as a means to an end, and a high percentage of 
time is spent on re-planning.  Plan-driven methods use plans to anchor their processes 
and again to provide for a spectrum for communication. As stated in the Manifesto for 
Agile Software Development, the emphasis in agile methodologies is on individuals and 
interactions (Beck et al., 2005).  
An important part of agile development—maybe even the most important part—is 
testing. Testing is a way to validate that the customers have specified the right product 
and that the developers built the right product.  Testing requires that code be developed 
and executed, which is frequent in agile approaches. However, with plan-driven 
approaches, testing does not occur as often, resulting in problems being discovered late in 
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the development cycle; these problems are expensive to fix. In most agile approaches, it 
is recommended to automate testing procedures. As Beck (2003) stated: 
This has significant advantages:  
• Ensures that the requirement is testable  
• Avoids documentation minutia 
• It enables incremental build and test opportunities 
• It helps modularize the application structure and provides a safety net for 
re-factoring 
• It helps form an explicit working knowledge of the application. (p. 74) 
Table 4.   Traditional versus Agile Software Development (From Nerur, Mahapatra, 
& Mangalara, 2005, p. 75) 
 Traditional Agile 
Fundamental assumptions Systems are fully 
specifiable, predictable, and 
can be built through 
meticulous and extensive 
planning. 
High-quality, adaptive 
software can be developed 
by small teams using the 
principles of continuous 
design improvement in 
testing based on rapid 
feedback and change. 
Control  Process centric People centric 
Management style Command and control Leadership in collaboration 
Knowledge management Explicit Tacit 





Communication Formal  Informal 
Customer’s role Important Critical 
Project cycle Guided by tasks or 
activities 
Guided by product features 
Development model Life-cycle model (waterfall, 
spiral, or some variation) 





with high formalization) 
Organic (flexible in part to 
dissipate encouraging 
cooperative social action) 
Technology No restrictions Favors object-oriented 
technology 
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5. When to Apply Agile Development  
Agile methodologies are appropriate for projects that have high variability, 
uncertain requirements, and unknown capabilities of people and that are utilizing new 
technology (Nerur et al., 2005).  To better guide the decision-making requirements on 
when to use agile approaches and when to use plan-driven approaches, I have identified 
five critical factors, introduced by Cockburn et al. (2005) to be most appropriate. As 
described by Boehm and Turner (2004), these factors are project size, criticality, 
dynamism, personnel, and cultural factors.  Table 5 describes these factors.  
Table 5.   The Five Critical Agility/Plan-Driven Factors (From Boehm & Turner, 
2004, p. 55) 
Factor Agility Discriminators Plan-Driven Discriminators  
Size (number of 
personnel) 
Well matched to small products 
and teams. Reliance on tacit 
knowledge limits scalability. 
Methods evolved to handle 
large products and teams. Hard 
to tailor down to small 
projects. 
Criticality (Loss due 
to impact of defect) 
Untested on safety-critical 
products. Potential difficulties 
with simple design and lack of 
documentation. 
Methods evolved to handle 
highly critical products. Hard 







Simple design and continuous 
re-factoring are excellent for 
highly dynamic environments 
but a source of potentially 
expensive rework for highly 
stable environments. 
Detailed plans and big design 
up-front are excellent for a 
highly stable environment, but 
a source of expensive rework 




as defined in Table 
3) 
Requires continuous presence 
of critical mass of scarce Level 
2 or 3 experts (as defined 
earlier). Risky to use non-agile 
Level 1B people. 
Need for critical mass of 
scarce Level 2 and 3 experts 
(defined earlier) during project 
definition but can work with 
fewer late in the project. Can 
usually accommodate some 
Level 1B people. 
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Factor Agility Discriminators Plan-Driven Discriminators  
Culture (thriving in 
chaos vs. order) 
Thrives in a culture where 
people feel comfortable and 
powered by having many 
degrees of freedom (thriving on 
chaos). 
Thrives in a culture where 
people feel comfortable and 
empowered by having their 
roles defined by clear policies 
and procedures (thriving on 
order). 
Boehm and Turner (2004) developed Figure 8, which does a nice job 
summarizing graphically the five critical factors associated with agile and plan-driven 
efforts.  The closer you move towards the center of the diagram, the more appropriate it is 
to use agile methods. By rating a project along all of the five axes, a visual evaluation of 
relationships can be identified. 
 
  




III. WATCHKEEPER AND MASI 
As stated in Chapter I, my interest in agile system development started during my 
time working on both the MASI and WatchKeeper projects.  The work I did on these 
projects came during my time while stationed at Coast Guard Headquarters from 2008 to 
2011.  My role with both projects was in the capacity of sponsor’s representative, and, as 
such, my responsibilities included acting as a liaison between the end users of the 
systems (operators) and the rest of the project team.  As the sponsor’s representative, I 
worked very closely with the sponsor, and my main obligation was to ensure that 
requirements that the end user identified as important were built into the system being 
developed.  In the following paragraphs, I will provide a synopsis of both the 
WatchKeeper and MASI projects. The projects will be broken down by their goals and 
objectives, the doctrine in process that was followed for each project, how progress was 
measured, the stakeholders within the projects, the communication effort within the 
projects, and finally the other factors that influenced the projects.   
A. WATCHKEEPER GOALS AND OBJECTIVES  
The WatchKeeper project was the IT component of the larger Interagency 
Operations Centers (IOC) project.  The IOC project was a result of the mandates of the 
Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act of 2006, and directed the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to transform Coast Guard Sector Command 
Centers (SCCs) to host interagency members and meet the challenges of interagency 
coordination and maritime security.  The three gaps identified by the SAFE Port Act were 
the following:  
1. basic awareness of vessel activities near vulnerable port and coastal 
infrastructure, 
2. systems linking the ever-increasing volume of information with vessels in 
ways that help decision-makers determine threats and develop the correct 
course of action, and 
3. means for effective information sharing and joint operations with port 
partners. 
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The volume of maritime domain awareness (MDA) information necessary to 
manage Coast Guard and interagency operations has increased dramatically and exceeded 
the field’s capacity to collect and process it. The Coast Guard needed new information 
management capabilities to solve the coordination and operational challenges faced by 
today’s interagency decision-makers. Decision-makers lack the ability to see, understand, 
and share information that is critical to coordinate interagency operations in port and 
coastal areas. This situation severely inhibits efficient information sharing with 
interagency partners, resulting in reduced mission capabilities in the ports and waterways 
within the U.S.  The WatchKeeper project was the IT system that was identified to help 
close these gaps, and as such, was targeted to provide the following capabilities:   
1. Integrated vessel targeting (IVT): This component integrates the 
targeting results of various agencies, and builds a consolidated threat 
picture of people, vessels, and cargo operating within an  operating 
area (OPAREA) as provided by intelligence and law enforcement 
communities in support of the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
missions.  
2. Interagency operational planning (IOP): This planning component 
integrates federal, state, and local asset status and schedules.  As such, 
better coordination and more efficient resource allocation between 
agencies can be realized.  
3. Operations monitoring (OM): This component manages the IOC daily 
schedule that was created by the IOP component.  It manages the 
schedule against all emergent events, such as search and rescue, spills, 
and other events occurring outside the operational planning window.  
OM creates and shares the tactical picture, including command and 
control, mission status, and the status of IOC forces and Blue Force 
Tracks (BFT). 
B.  WATCHKEEPER PROJECT PROCESS AND DOCTRINE  
As the sponsor’s representative for the project, I along with the sponsor’s 
directorate was responsible for providing a few key documents early on in the project.  
These documents included the mission need statement (MNS), the Preliminary 
Operational Requirements Document, (pORD), and the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD).  The WatchKeeper project’s MNS was approved in 2005 and was 
revalidated in February 2009.  This MNS verified the capability gaps identified in the 
SAFE Port Act within ports and waterways within the U.S., and was used initially to 
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guide the needs of the project.  In addition to the MNS, the pORD was developed in April 
2008 to provide more fidelity to the actual requirements that would be needed, and to aid 
in the development of the more robust ORD, which was signed in 2010.  Therefore, the 
only requirements guide that was used early on for the initial development effort was the 
pORD, which again, only provided a very high-level conceptual need, not system specific 
requirements.  
For the project management effort, the following doctrine and Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs) were used to guide the project:  
• Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM) 
• Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
• Mission Engineering Process Guide: This process guide was developed 
while working with and visiting select sectors to identify key processes 
and workflows of SCCs. The focus on the mission engineering effort was 
to identify processes and not IT solutions; the effort was to capture what 
was happening within the command centers at the various watch positions, 
to better define systems requirements.   
• Two-chartered IPT: The two teams were 
1. information management IPT and 
2. senior leadership.   
C. WATCHKEEPER PROJECT PROGRESS MEASUREMENT 
One key MSAM requirement was that earned value management (EVM) be used 
as the performance measurement tool, because of the dollar threshold that WatchKeeper 
met. The goal of EVM is to integrate the contract scope of work with scheduling cost 
elements at appropriate levels for optimum project planning and control. The MSAM 
directs that EVM be used against a work breakdown structure (WBS) at sufficient levels 
to enable an understanding of the performance against the allocated time and budget.  
This information is then used to create an integrated master schedule (IMS), which 
incorporates the WBS items.  
EVM is also the technique that communicates a project status within a portfolio 
and is an integral component of the Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300  
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(Primavera Systems, 2008). The MSAM does not provide clear guidance on how EVM is 
to be incorporated but instead directs the PM to comply with the DHS (2009) guidance. 
The DHS guidance states:  
Title V of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 requires 
agency heads to approve or define the costs, performance, and schedule 
goals for major acquisitions to achieve, on average, 90 percent of the cost, 
performance and schedule goals established (p. 8).  
Additionally, when EVM is employed for a project, it is imperative that it be 
supported by management and stakeholders at all levels (Fleming & Koppelman, 2009).  
All stakeholders have a vested interest in the project, and it is important that everyone 
have a rudimentary understanding of the EVM data. EVM also enables stakeholders to 
understand what other stakeholders are doing.  The following 10 requirements were 
identified by Fleming and Koppelman (2009) as being critical to successfully implement 
EVM:  
1. EVM requires the project to be fully understood, defined, and scoped to 
100 percent of the project effort.  Stakeholders need to know what 
constitutes 100 percent of the work in order to measure progress along the 
way. 
2. EVM requires that the defined scope be decomposed—broken down into 
major management tasks, which are selected as points of management 
control—and then planned and scheduled down to the detailed work 
package level.  
3. EVM requires that an integrated and measurable project baseline be 
authorized—relating the scope of work directly to an achievable budget—
then locked into a specific time frame for performance measurement. This 
is called bottom-up planning. 
4. EVM requires that only authorized budgeted work be accomplished, 
meaning all work being done must be tightly controlled.  Scope creep 
cannot be allowed.  
5. EVM requires that physical performance be measured. 
6. EVM requires that the values used be related to the planned values to 
accurately reflect performance against the project baseline. 
7. EVM requires that reporting be consistent with the earned value being 
measured to allow for an accurate portrayal of cost performance. The 
relationship of actual cost must reflect the true cost performance. Earned 
value less actual cost provides cost performance. 
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8. EVM requires that a forecast be made periodically (weekly, monthly) to 
estimate the amount of time and money it will take to complete 100 
percent of the project. 
9. EVM requires that a full disclosure of actual results be made available to 
all stakeholders who have a vested interest in the project. All stakeholders 
will receive the same actual performance results. 
10. EVM requires that project managers, in conjunction with key 
stakeholders, decide on the appropriate action to be taken to stay within 
authorized budget expectations. 
D. STAKEHOLDERS, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Figure 9 at the end of this section provides a graphical representation of the 
hierarchy and organizational layout of WatchKeeper’s stakeholders.  It is not an official 
organizational hierarchy of the Coast Guard, but rather the organizational hierarchy of the 
WatchKeeper project from personal experience.  
1. Sponsor and Sponsor’s Representative 
• Initially, CG-741 was the sponsor’s representative and CG-761 was the 
sponsor. This later changed: CG-761 became a sponsor’s representative 
and CG-741 maintained the role of the sponsor. The switch in 
responsibilities occurred when new leadership reported aboard both CG-
761 and CG-741, creating a leadership turnover in both directorates.  
Both incoming captains were newly promoted, and no relationship 
between the two had been established yet.  After the change in leadership, 
CG-761 took over the role of sponsor’s representative and CG-741 
assumed the duties of sponsor. Interestingly, the outgoing captain of CG-
761 became the leader of the Command Control and Communications 
Center (C2CEN), which was later identified as the lead developer of the 
WatchKeeper system, and the outgoing captain of CG-741 retired.  
• CG-9: Program manager: The program manager (PM) was a senior 
commander (O5) and had the overall responsibility of the project.  This 
created an interesting dynamic in the senior decision-making for the 
project.  Although the commander was more than capable of performing 
the duties required of the PM, there was still an underlying reality that he 
was junior to other decision-making stakeholders, given that they were all 
O6s.  
• CG-6: CG-6 included the technical agents and technical leaders of the 
project. They were to oversee all engineering efforts with respect to 
impacts to enterprise, security, and accreditation. Both centers of 
excellence (C2CEN, Operations System Center [OSC]) are under CG-6 
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leadership; yet, for this development effort, the PM (CG-9) had the 
authority to direct the developers. This created an interesting dynamic in 
which the normal reporting and tasking chain of command was then 
bypassed; CG-9 directly tasked a CG-6 asset. 
• C2CEN: When C2CEN was given the decision on which technical 
organization/corporation/agency to hire, the challenge was whether they 
should include themselves as a possible candidate for the job.  After 
consideration, the decision was made that C2CEN would be the lead 
developing agents for this project.  
• Operations Systems Center (OSC): OSC is another Coast Guard Center 
of Excellence that works for CG-6.  Once it was decided that the Coast 
Guard was going to undertake this project in-house (from a 
developmental standpoint), OSC was earmarked for providing a piece of 
the proposed technical solution. As such, C2CEN would develop two 
thirds of the proposed solution and OSC would develop the remaining 
one third.  
• Research and Development Center (R&DC): The R&D center was hired 
to provide support for this project.  
•  Contract Support: Contractor support was pivotal in the creation of the 
Mission Engineering Process document.  This document laid the 
groundwork for standardizing the processes that the WatchKeeper system 
should be designed to facilitate. Contract support worked very closely 
with both the sponsor and the sponsor’s representative on identifying the 
workflow of the end users of the system. This work helped to identify 
what would later be known as IVT, IOP, and OM. The goal here was to 
focus on the process and not on solutions or technology. The team felt 
that it would be prudent to truly understand the workflow inputs and 
outputs and functional areas they resided in before coming up with the 
technical solution.  
• Operators and end users: Coast Guard command centers.  
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Figure 9.  Stakeholder Organization 
E. COMMUNICATIONS 
Communication for this project was challenging given the project’s size and 
scope.  The PM established many processes to better facilitate information sharing 
between directorates and key stakeholders, but this was never realized. Some of the 
variables that challenged the PM’s effort included the geographical separation of key 
stakeholders.  C2CEN is located in Portsmouth, Virginia; OSC is the located in 
Kearneysville, West Virginia; CG-7 is located in the Transpoint building at Coast Guard 
Headquarters; and CG-9 and CG-6 are located at the Jamaal building at Coast Guard 
Headquarters. The challenges of being geographically separated created a logistical 
nightmare for the project. Stakeholders were aware of these challenges and tried to 
implement various forms of communications to minimize potential negative impacts. 
These tools included bi-weekly information management IPT meetings, weekly progress 
report meetings, monthly senior management team meetings, and day-to-day emails, to 
name a few. One of the biggest shortcomings of having physically separated key 
stakeholders was that too much time was wasted getting members up to speed at the 
beginning of every meeting. For example, despite having met two weeks ago, it took a bit 
of time for mid-level management to reassess and understand the issues that were last 
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discussed during the previous meetings. Without face-to-face communication on a 
regular (daily) basis, a lot of time was wasted playing catch-up.  Additionally, 
stakeholders did not physically attend many of the meetings in person but rather attended 
telephonically.  This only added to the inefficient and ineffective use of time.  
F. OTHER FACTORS 
The landscape for this project was complicated.  The major stakeholder leadership 
was either (1) a newly promoted captain or commander or (2) a seasoned captain with 
many years of O6 experience.  This was interesting because the new captains tried to 
assert themselves as seasoned captains and at times received pushback from the more 
veteran captains. As stated earlier, the PM was a senior O5 and was in charge of the 
project and, as such, had to make unpopular decisions. This had to be done very carefully 
because of the differences in ranks, which often led to wasted time. Given this dynamic, 
it was often difficult to obtain a clear picture of who was in charge of the project at any 
given point. On numerous occasions, CG-761 claimed that they were responsible while 
CG-741 felt that they were in charge. C2CEN operated as if they were in charge and held 
sole responsibility for deciding on the technical solution for the project.  
G. WATCHKEEPER OUTCOME 
1. WatchKeeper Outcome Compared to Goals and Objectives 
It is difficult to classify the WatchKeeper project as a success in any capacity.  
The project was delivered years late, with limited capability, and was grossly over 
budget.  There are many projects that have lofty goals, but that must settle for less 
because of factors outside the control of the program; this is true for WatchKeeper as 
well, but is not the primary reason for the project’s failure.  WatchKeeper’s shortcomings 
can be attributed to many factors, all which will be explored in Chapter IV of this thesis.  
H. MISSION AND ASSET SCHEDULING INTERFACE (MASI)  
1. MASI Goals and Objectives 
The MASI project was originally developed to support the Coast Guard IOP 
needs of WatchKeeper.  It was the second of the three capabilities WatchKeeper was 
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going to deliver.  MASI was going to be capable of displaying all assets, all asset 
statuses, and all planned, in progress, and completed missions planned.  MASI was to 
eventually support port partner-specific planning and scheduling requirements as well 
with later builds.  MASI was to provide a single user interface for near-real-time 
transparency of all asset and mission information.  MASI was to support pre-
planning/emergent planning, scheduling, and the execution of missions.  This single 
presentation layer is Web based, and was to be available to anyone authorized for access 
to the system, including planners, watchstanders, and port partners. 
Modernization places a premium on information transparency throughout the 
Coast Guard and DHS.  This is particularly true at the Sector level, where the majority of 
mission execution occurs.  Prioritizing missions and assigning resources are under the 
responsibility of the sector commander to optimize resource employment across the 11 
CG-mission categories and subcategories.  The effective and efficient management of 
resources can only occur with transparent planning and execution, and by making the 
results visible to all levels of command. 
Mission planning is conducted via many different formats, tools, and processes.  
For example, spreadsheets, whiteboards, and Microsoft Outlook calendars are all used to 
perform planning functions within Coast Guard units.  The results of this inferior process 
are as follows: 
• The various planning products are not published in a manner that provides 
a single operational view to the chain of command and command centers, 
resulting in degraded situational awareness. 
• Command centers have incomplete visibility of information on asset 
statuses, planned activities, assets underway, and mission completion. 
• Response to emergent events is often reactionary without taking into 
consideration the impact of resource redeployment and without the 
transparency to apply risk-based decision support. 
• There is low awareness of Prevention Department activities. 
• After missions are complete, the missions are recorded in various 
enterprise authoritative databases (e.g., Abstract of Operations [AOPS], 
Aviation Logistics Management Information System [ALMIS], Marine 
Information for Safety and Law Enforcement [MISLE]) without a clear 
relationship between common data elements. 
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MASI was to provide the following capabilities and services:  
• A single user interface will provide a near-real-time presentation of all 
resources and statuses.   
• A single user interface will provide a near-real-time presentation of all 
mission assignments planned, underway, and completed. 
• A single user interface will provide a near-real-time presentation of 
significant events that will influence planning decisions. 
• Planners will enter planning and scheduling information and decisions in 
one place: MASI. 
• Units and command centers will then use MASI to manage the assigned 
missions and to support post-mission reporting. 
• A single location will be available for the display of resource and mission 
planning and execution, optimizing resource utilization against the highest 
priority missions. 
• Horizontal and vertical awareness will be provided for resource and 
mission planning, integration, and execution. 
• The requirement for reporting will not change, but the system will support 
standard reporting procedures. 
• MDA will be enhanced by providing command centers with single source 
visibility of all activities in the area of responsibility—planned, underway, 
and completed. 
• The system will contribute to the standardization of data management and, 
by extension, an increase in data integrity within authoritative systems.  
To provide a better perspective on MASI’s capabilities, the following is an 
example of the types of missions it will support:  
• Resources and missions across the entire Coast Guard are displayed in one 
application visible to all.  In the event of an emergent mission, all levels of 
command can see what assets are available and take the necessary actions 
to respond. 
• By being able to observe the changing assignments and resource statuses 
in MASI, higher levels of command can avoid direct contact with 
subordinate commands and command centers, thus freeing watchstanders 
to better accomplish the mission. 
• When a resource (e.g., cutter, boat, aircraft, or inspection team) gets 
underway, that movement is transparent to the command center. 
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• MASI captures non-asset and mission information (e.g., reasons for 
aborting mission, bar status, tidal closures) that is critical to operational 
decision-making and requirements analysis.  
Figures 10–12 are screenshots of the MASI system to illustrate the previously 
mentioned system concepts.  
 
Figure 10.  Overall Planning View of MASI 
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Figure 11.  Overall Planning of the Prototype System Used for MASI 
 
 
Figure 12.  Fictitious Monthly View of Assets in the MASI System 
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I. MASI PROJECT PROCESS AND DOCTRINE 
Although MASI was a component of WatchKeeper, and an IT system of its own 
right, it did not follow the same doctrine rigor as the WatchKeeper project.  The 
following is the list of the doctrine that MASI used:   
• Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC)  
• Requirements document (Excel spreadsheet) 
• Testing document (Excel spreadsheet) 
J. MASI PROJECT PROGRESS MEASUREMENT  
The MASI project’s progress was not tracked simultaneously with the 
WatchKeeper project, nor was MASI tracked with EVM.  MASI’s requirements were 
captured on an Excel spreadsheet with the sponsor, sponsor’s representative, end user, 
and developers.  This list of requirements was then prioritized by the end user and given 
to the developers to evaluate the realm of possibility and the development time needed.  
Once the developers completed this task, a final meeting was held and the official 
requirements list was generated.  This list of requirements was then used to guide the 
development effort and track progress towards capability delivery.  
K. STAKEHOLDERS, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
• CG-741: Sponsor  
• CG-761: Sponsor’s representative 
• CG-6: Technical agents 
• OSC: Developers 
• End user: Coast Guard Deployable Operational Group (DOG) 
• End users: Coast Guard Command Center personnel 
Figure 13 is a graphical representation of the MASI stakeholders. 
 42 
 
Figure 13.  MASI Stakeholders 
L. COMMUNICATIONS 
This MASI project included daily face-to-face communication with stakeholders. 
The key stakeholders at Coast Guard Headquarters (CG-7, CG-6, and CG-8) were part of 
the daily meetings, with the support of contractors. In addition to the short, daily 
interactions, there was a weekly meeting that included the stakeholders at Coast Guard 
Headquarters, the developers from OSC, and the end users of the DOG. These meetings 
were face to face as well and focused on reviewing development progress and refining 
requirements. The luxury of meeting face to face cannot be understated. Communicating 
technical ideas and concepts face to face enabled the team to be more focused and 
committed.  It nurtured a more creative, homogenous environment than other projects I 
have been involved with, and it facilitated storyboarding and the visual display of ideas 
and concepts, which was critical during the concept phase of the effort. The group size of 
these meetings was typically between five and seven people, and the meetings were held 
in a very informal setting, sometimes even standing. Ideas were mapped out on a 
whiteboard, and problems were worked through in a visual manner.  At least one day 
prior to the weekly meeting, the group agreed upon a small agenda and focused only on 












discussed at a later time.  This process proved to be especially useful in keeping the 
group on task and focused, given the compressed schedule of the MASI system.  Another 
outcome of these frequent meetings was that no issues went unresolved for more than one 
or two days. When challenges did come up, they were discussed as a group, rather than 
taking a parochial perspective. This allowed somewhat of a 360° view of the issue and 
generally resulted in a much more fruitful solution. 
Another valuable contribution to the effort was having the actual end users 
participate in both the daily and the weekly meetings and communicating with them face 
to face. Given that they were going to be the ones using the system on a daily basis, their 
input proved to be invaluable, and their contributions helped limit requirement 
ambiguities.  The developers were able to explain challenges they were facing, and trade-
offs could be agreed upon and understood. Additionally, priorities could be adjusted 
accordingly.  Having access to the end user with this frequency also facilitated the 
development of training for the new system. Having the end user present during the 
development process allowed for a more thorough understanding of the system in a more 
contextual sense.  The end user was also able to communicate actual workflow that 
would be required of the system, and engineering “best guesses” were eliminated from a 
developmental perspective.  
In the MASI project, formal communication with senior leadership occurred on a 
weekly basis; although this communication was more frequent than communication in the 
WatchKeeper project, it was far less cumbersome because it lacked the WatchKeeper 
project’s reporting requirements.  The report that was generated for the MASI project was 
more anecdotal yet more useful when it came to relaying ideas, challenges, and the actual 
status of the project.  The format and amount of information that was relayed during the 
MASI project wasn’t regimented, but the content was. As a group, we felt that it was 
more important to capture accurate information rather than a specific amount of 
information. If there was nothing to report, then there was nothing to report. The group 
felt no obligation to fabricate information to placate leadership, and leadership 
appreciated this. The report that was generated represented every stakeholder’s priorities, 
and issues that could not be agreed upon were identified as such. If issues arose from the 
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report, the team met within a day to address those issues. Given the political and 
technical issues surrounding the MASI project, this form of communication helped to 
ease any concerns in a timely manner.  This frequent reporting also facilitated the means 
for any course corrections that senior leadership felt prudent to address quickly. 
M. MASI: OTHER FACTORS  
As previously stated, the MASI project was originally scripted to be one third of 
the WatchKeeper project (with the other two thirds being IVT and OM), but was directed 
to move out independently from the WatchKeeper effort. The reason for this push was 
that the designated approving authority (DAA) deemed MASI’s predecessor Maritime 
Homeland Security Operations (MHSOPS) to be a security risk to the Coast Guard 
enterprise.  The MHSOPS system was used as the prototype for the MASI project and 
provided an operational capability to the DOG.  The DOG on a daily basis used 
MHSOPS, and if turned off, it would critically reduce the unit’s operational 
effectiveness. Therefore, there was pressure to deploy WatchKeeper, because of the 
security risk that MHSOPS posed—yet at the same time, the project team had to develop 
the system to meet the workflow of the DOG. From the DOG’s perspective, it did not 
want a new system because the system it was using already worked, and it did not want 
the aggravation of having to learn a new way of doing business. The leadership for the 
DOG was extremely concerned about turning MHSOPS off because it was their primary 
IT tool used for missions, and they had little faith that the new system (MASI) could be 
fielded in a timely fashion.  Therefore, getting the DOG’s buy-in and commitment was 
crucial.   
From an acquisition and project management perspective, the challenge was in 
trying to use existing doctrine (SDLC) to guide the MASI project within the compressed 
timeline. The DAA, the official in charge of assessing the risk of a system within an 
enterprise, ordered that MHSOPS be off-line within 90 days, thereby marking the line in 
the sand for the delivery date for MASI. The SDLC’s requirements could not be met in 
the timeframe established by the DAA or in the timeframe, in which MASI was being 
generated, so therein was the real challenge. The DAA, which is part of CG-6 and which 
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owns the SDLC process, was requiring MHSOPS to be turned off and MASI to be 
deployed in a timeframe outside the realm of possibilities with respect to meeting the 
SDLC mandates. This quagmire created tension within CG-6 that carried over to the 
MASI project team.  How could the team meet both requirements? The MASI team 
members attempted to establish a quasi-SDLC approach, and tried to customize the 
documentation requirements of the SDLC to meet the MASI project needs, but this was 
an exercise in futility given the delivery schedule of the project.  Another challenge was 
that the engineering approach in use to deliver the system did not dovetail with the SDLC 
requirements, regardless of how hard the group tried to make it fit.  The team was 
meeting more often and delivering requirements without having required documents 
generated.  This issue was eventually resolved with the agreement among team members 
and leadership that the only required documents for the initial MASI effort would be 
requirements documents and testing documents. The other mandated items would be 
addressed in future builds and when MHSOPS was off-line. 
N. MASI OUTCOME  
I would consider the MASI project a success, as it was delivered on time to meet 
the security risk identified by the DAA, while meeting the requirements of the DOG (end 
user).  The project went from concept to delivery within three months with very little 
funding.  With respect to MASI’s contribution to the WatchKeeper project, this 
integration still had not happened at the time this thesis was written.  However, this is not 
the fault of the MASI project not having the required capability, but rather the 
WatchKeeper project’s inability to integrate the two systems.  I will explore the MASI 
project’s outcome further in Chapter IV. 
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IV. PROJECT IMPACTS 
In this chapter, I provide the important variables for both the WatchKeeper and 
MASI projects. I analyze and interpret variables that impacted the projects, using a 
similar format to Chapter III. I examine the variables, process and doctrine (rigidity), 
progress measurement, stakeholders, communication, and other factors of both projects. I 
then provide a relative score on a scale of 1 to 10 of these variables on how well each 
respective project did in that area.  For example, if the project did well in that area, the 
score would be closer to 10, if the project did poorly, the score would be closer to 1.  I 
also provide the effect on cost, schedule, and performance the respective variable did.  
For example, I examine the progress measurement variable for both the WatchKeeper 
and MASI projects; I rate it with a relative score, and then provide the effect of that score 
on the project’s cost, schedule, and performance.  Finally, the chapter ends with a 
comparison of both the WatchKeeper and MASI projects with agile system development.   
A. WATCHKEEPER PROCESS AND DOCTRINE (RIGIDITY) 
As I stated in Chapter III, WatchKeeper used the MSAM and acquisition life-
cycle process to manage the project. These processes are defined by upfront planning, 
formal documentation, and a linear phase approach, and do not provide an opportunity 
for the program to move back to previous phases (Benito, Casagni, Mayfield, & 
Northern, 2010).  WatchKeeper was to deliver new capabilities that had never been 
delivered with previous IT systems. As such, WatchKeeper by definition was filled with 
many uncertainties with respect to requirements, yet because of the doctrine that was 
being followed required that these requirements be accurately defined upfront.  One 
factor that led to the uncertainty with requirements was that the end user had a difficult 
time defining what was needed or desired.  This uncertainty with requirements may be 
the primary reason for the difficulties the WatchKeeper project faced (Atkinson, 
Crawford, & Ward, 2006).  Adhering to the heavyweight process outlined with the 
MSAM and acquisition mandates, forced the program and project to get everything right 
the first time, which is an impossible task if the desired results are uncertain.  
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Additionally, these heavyweight processes were designed for large weapon systems and 
not IT systems (Benito et al., 2010).  As Duquette et al. (2008) describes, “Typically, the 
acquisition development cycle is quite lengthy, as much as 5 to 10 years; and this 
development cycle is too long for IT programs” (p. 25).  By the time these technologies 
are fielded, they are outdated and no longer address the needs of the end user.   
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the 
process in the acquisition cycle that is designed to reduce uncertainty with development 
by focusing on needed capabilities, rather than future threats.  Although the JCIDS 
process is an effort to reduce ambiguity with the requirements phase of the process, it is, 
in my opinion, still far too cumbersome for the delivery of IT systems.  As such, I feel 
that the WatchKeeper project was handcuffed from the very beginning because of the 
uncertainty with the requirements and that an agile approach would have produced better 
results.  WatchKeeper’s shortcomings can be illustrated with an excerpt from a 2010 
letter from the sponsor’s representative (CG-761) to the PM (CG-9): 
As the Sponsor Representative for the information management 
(WatchKeeper) component of the Interagency Operations Center I have 
serious concerns with the current status, progress, and direction of the 
project. The project has had several system scope changes, has missed 
every capability delivery date, and is currently months behind schedule on 
the next deliverable.  These delays reach beyond the project, and are 
beginning to negatively impact both the Sector Command and port 
partners alike.  For example, the Operational Testing and Training 
schedules have been rearranged 3-times with Sector personnel, putting an 
unnecessary burden on an already over-taxed workforce.  The root cause 
of these issues stems from the failure to implement basic project 
management tools, including an Integrated Master Schedule and an 
appropriate Integrated Support staff to meet the requirements and 
mandates of the project. I am no longer confident that our system 
development aligns with our operational requirements; therefore, I am 
again requesting detailed architecture views/diagrams, Integrated Project 
Plan, a summary report of the technical challenges encountered thus far 
and the action officer assigned to solve these challenges. (Sponsor 
representative, personal communication, October 4, 2009)  
Clearly, there were concerns from the sponsor’s representative perspective about 
the management approach taken to deliver the WatchKeeper project. Many of the 
project’s managerial challenges were not due to competence issues but rather to the fact 
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that the PM had no alternative approaches other than the one dictated by the MSAM and 
the acquisition process mandates.  Many of these mandates added no value to the process 
but had to be complied with because of the dollar threshold that WatchKeeper met. The 
inflexibility of these policies increased the cumbersomeness of an already complex 
project.  These policies prevented opportunities for program management to seek 
alternative engineering approaches more suited for a project with these characteristics 
(e.g., unknown requirements, use of new technologies, large team size, and 
geographically separated stakeholders) and forced the use of traditional system 
development applications. As such, this traditional approach required that a plethora of 
documents be generated—many of which called for detailed information that was 
unknown given the uncertainty of the project requirements.   
Additionally, the actual system development approach and solution were chosen 
prior to establishing a requirements document. There was the nonspecific pORD that 
outlined and identified ideas and concepts at a very high level, but by no means did it 
provide the fidelity needed to develop an actual system or engineering solution. A 
detailed requirements document did not exist because at this point, the end user (via the 
sponsor’s representative) had not identified them. The Mission Engineering Book, which 
would later be delivered to show workflows and business processes that WatchKeeper 
would facilitate, had not been developed yet, and the missions that were to be 
accomplished were not completely identified. Regardless of these facts, C2CEN set out to 
start developing the system, using the pORD as guidance (Appendix 1). To add to this 
problem, the developers derived the original system requirements alone—without other 
stakeholders present.  The impact of the first iteration of system requirements generated 
by the developers in a silo would prove to be an issue that the project never recovered 
from.  
B. WATCHKEEPER PROJECT PROGRESS MEASUREMENT 
Meeting requirements was a challenge for the WatchKeeper project. The project 
requirements were not identified, so it was impossible to understand 100 percent of the 
project’s scope. As stated, EVM requires full disclosure of actual results so that all 
 50 
stakeholders receive the same information and allows only one set of books. There were 
several attempts made to accomplish this, but there was never 100 percent buy-in from 
stakeholders due to a lack of trust. A measurable project baseline must be identified and 
locked down for EVM to hold any value, but this never happened. There were attempts to 
comply with locking down the EVM variables, but because there was not a clear 
understanding of requirements, this was an impossible objective.  Finally, EVM requires 
that a forecast be made periodically, but because of moving baselines, shifting delivery 
schedules, a number of requirements to be fulfilled per release, and closed 
communication among stakeholders, the EVM effort proved to be a waste of time for 
WatchKeeper.  
Although a valid attempt was made to establish EVM requirements as mandated 
by the MSAM doctrine, at no time was WatchKeeper close to meeting and achieving a 90 
percent success rate on cost, performance, and schedule goals, as identified by the DHS 
(2009) requirement.  The lack of accurate EVM data contributed to the WatchKeeper 
project’s failing to meet acquisition milestones on time, resulting in a loss of faith at the 
DHS level. The WatchKeeper project failures with EVM are not a reflection of EVM 
techniques and their usefulness; it is a reflection of poor EVM execution.  If the 
requirements for WatchKeeper had been understood, if communication channels had 
been forged, or if the project had not been handcuffed with cumbersome mandates from 
the acquisition process, the likelihood of EVM success would have been far greater.  The 
WatchKeeper project’s failure to implement EVM does not suggest that EVM was 
incorrect; it suggests that the Coast Guard could not properly facilitate the requirements 
of EVM.   
C. STAKEHOLDERS AND COMMUNICATION 
Additional factors that led to challenges of the WatchKeeper project included a 
lack of cohesiveness among key stakeholders, a failure to communicate effectively, a lack 
of trust, the geographic separation of stakeholders, and a sense that there would be 
endless funding for the project.  It did not matter what was done; it could always be fixed.  
On more than one occasion, various stakeholders—including at the leadership level—
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mentioned that the first version of WatchKeeper did not count and that it was disposable.  
This philosophy removed any feeling of accountability from stakeholders and perpetuated 
an environment that fostered complacency and stakeholder independence.  Delivering 
useful code did not appear to be the primary focus; instead, meeting the mandates of the 
acquisition process and the MSAM was the priority, since failure to do this would surely 
derail the project at the DHS level, which would lead to a loss of funding.  As a result, 
stakeholders worked diligently, but independently, on delivering their required portion of 
the MSAM documents, with little care as to the actual requirements or system needs.   
As mentioned in Chapter III, WatchKeeper communication efforts often were in 
vain.  Many of the meetings were held at a distance because of the geographical 
separation of the stakeholders.  These consequences of non-face-to-face meetings were 
misconceptions of information passed between stakeholders.  Each directorate had its in-
house method for internal communication and its own dialect, but when these various 
lexicons were brought together in a group setting, they did not necessarily result in a clear 
understanding of the message.  Document control and management were also challenges. 
Despite having a consensus that it was important to maintain document control, leaders of 
the project never could properly manage documents. There were many meetings where 
two different versions of a document were being reviewed simultaneously, and a lot of 
time was wasted simply trying to identify the appropriate artifact to discuss.  
D. WATCHKEEPER OTHER FACTORS  
The WatchKeeper stakeholder dynamics were interesting.  Aside from the 
organizational and hierarchy challenges, the biggest hurdle was the political landscape 
that existed amongst stakeholders.  This politically charged jockeying ended up being a 
true detriment to the project. Besides the normal disagreements and uncertainties that are 
present in any project, this project had a level of animosity between stakeholders because 
of military ranks that were involved. There were meetings where quarreling dominated 
the agenda, and there was a lack of trust between stakeholders that at times bordered on 
resentment. C2CEN felt that nobody trusted its efforts, while both directorates in CG-7 
felt that C2CEN was not being honest with the development efforts that were underway.  
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CG-6 had an interesting role: C2CEN is typically tasked by CG-6, but because this 
project was a major acquisition, CG-9 was in charge and directed C2CEN, which 
presented internal challenges within both CG-9 and CG-6. 
Senior leadership also introduced pressure to the WatchKeeper.  It was often said 
by senior management that this project “was too big to fail.” Therefore, the information 
that was passed to the decision-makers was often a more positive perspective than reality. 
No group was willing to be responsible for the failure of the project. Milestone 
deliverables and expectations were all managed in a way that would present the 
organizing group in the best light. From a program management perspective, it was very 
difficult to gauge the true pulse of the project given these realities. 
Another challenge for the WatchKeeper project was that the developers, based on 
their interpretation of the pORD document, derived the WatchKeeper system 
requirements independently. This introduced many challenges to the delivery of the 
WatchKeeper system.  The developers decided which requirements to deliver and when 
to deliver them. Initially, the developers broke the requirements into three spiral 
deliverables. The first spiral would deliver eight percent of the requirements, the second 
spiral was slotted to deliver 12 percent of the requirements, and the third spiral would 
deliver the remaining 80 percent of the requirements. After missing the delivery date of 
the first spiral by 114 days, the developers reduced the targeted scope by 50 percent and 
added five additional spiral releases. Again, these decisions were made independently 
without input from other stakeholders. 
The WatchKeeper project also failed to meet testing events.  Because of this 
failure, the Coast Guard finally decided—with pressure from the DHS—to reduce the 
scope of WatchKeeper.  Therefore, in 2010, the DHS gave the direction that 
WatchKeeper was to be deployed as a technology demonstrator rather than a full-fledged 
system of record, which removed the MSAM requirements from the WatchKeeper effort.  
This decision came at a price.  The WatchKeeper project realized substantial funding 
cuts, and there was operational backlash as well.  At the time of writing this thesis, 
WatchKeeper is still being deployed throughout the nation at Coast Guard SCCs as a 
technology demonstration, with far fewer capabilities than envisioned. 
 53 
E. MASI OUTCOME COMPARED TO GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The MASI project was delivered on time, but more importantly, it met the 
operational needs of the DOG.  Therefore, MHSOPS could be taken off-line and the 
security risk to the enterprise was removed.  Another success of MASI was the 
effectiveness of the training that was established and the execution of this training to the 
DOG in their subordinate units. The success of this training is a direct result of having the 
DOG representation during the development process. Not every desired capability was 
delivered with the first iteration of MASI, but the system that was delivered could be 
used effectively to accomplish the DOG’s missions.  Without doubt, there is a direct 
correlation between the success of the project and the development approach taken to 
deliver the system. 
F. MASI PROCESS AND DOCTRINE 
Another factor, and quite possibly the most important one with respect to MASI’s 
success, was the reality that the project did not get bogged down with documentation and 
paperwork. Although it did follow the SDLC as outlined in Chapter III, it was a modified 
SDLC that only required documentation that was beneficial to the development efforts. 
Having flexibility within this process was incredibly useful to stakeholders.  There was 
no expectation to simply “check the box” for paperwork drills.  It was not as if the MASI 
project did not follow a process or create documentation; the MASI project simply was 
allowed to modify established procedures to facilitate a more useful development 
approach. Time was of the essence given the security risk identified by MHS OPS, and 
the flexibility allowed for tailoring the regimented process was significant. 
G. MASI PROGRESS MEASUREMENT 
Another contribution to the success of MASI was the manner in which progress 
was assessed. The metric that was used for assessing the progress of the project was not 
EVM like that of WatchKeeper, but rather actual capability delivered by the developers. 
As stated earlier, priorities were established during the daily face-to-face meetings, and 
the developers used these priorities as a recipe for delivering the system. During the 
weekly meetings, progress reports on these priorities were presented to the group, and on 
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a bi-monthly basis, tangible system capabilities were demonstrated.  Another crucial 
component of the delivery of the MASI system was the management of expectations.  By 
no means was the first release of the system expected to be the end-all and be-all, but 
rather it was viewed as a first foundational step in a series of releases, and everybody was 
aware of this.  Again, the frequent meetings, the establishment of an agreed-upon 
direction, access to a prototype system (MHSOPS) as a guide, and honest stakeholder 
communication simplified many of the complexities that typically hinder progress in 
system development efforts.   
H. MASI STAKEHOLDERS AND COMMUNICATION  
Face-to-face daily communication was also critical in the delivery of MASI. I 
cannot remember an instance where a key stakeholder was unaware of the progress of the 
project or the immediate future goals of the effort. Face-to-face interaction was the 
driving force behind this. In addition, having the developer, the customer, the testing 
team, and the enterprise team communicate in the manner in which they did knocked out 
many obstacles and ambiguities typical of a software development effort.  As outlined in 
Chapter II, people are the driving force behind successful software development 
deliveries. This was realized with the MASI project. 
I. MASI: OTHER FACTORS 
Although the MASI project was successful, and a capability was delivered to the 
operator, the MASI project still has challenges ahead. As with any endeavor, momentum 
must be maintained, which requires that leadership continue to support the effort.  There 
is still the need to integrate MASI into WatchKeeper, and this is going to present some 
challenges to both the WatchKeeper and MASI projects.  With that said, if the 
appropriate level of importance and support is given, there is no doubt that the MASI and 
WatchKeeper integration effort will be successful.   
J. WATCHKEEPER AND MASI PROJECTS RELATIVE SCORE 
As described at the beginning of this chapter, I will provide a description and 
metric value for variables that impacted both the WatchKeepr and MASI projects.  The 
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variable will be underlined, the project in reference bolded, and the relative score follows 
the related project.  The impact of the variable is then explained in relation to the effect it 
had on the project’s schedule, cost, and performance, which is identified in italics.  
Progress measurement: the importance of measuring the progress a software 
development effort cannot be undervalued. A baseline must be established and locked 
down so that a road map can be established.  Progress measurement is the metric that is 
used to communicate work that has been done and work that remains, to both 
stakeholders within the project and interested parties outside the project. 
WatchKeeper  
How well the WatchKeeper project did with progress measurement on a scale of 
1-10 (1= low, 10= high):  2 
Effect 
Schedule: although EVM was used for the project, the deliverables were never 
base-lined or locked down.  Requirements were moved from date to date, or deleted all 
together by the developers.  As such, clear deliverables were never established; what was 
being delivered and when was never clear, which made scheduling extremely difficult.  
Milestones were established and missed.  When this happened, another schedule was 
established and new milestones were identified.  These new milestones contained more 
deliverables than the previous milestone, and typically less time. 
Costs: the impact from the lack of an honest progress measurement tool is 
obvious.  The WachKeeper project could not definitively express progress within the 
project because of the lack of implementing a progress measurement tool. This had a 
negative impact on the costs of the project. 
Performance: with the requirement delivery schedule never being established, it 
was unclear as to what the final capabilities of the system would yield.  To date, the 
WatchKeeper system still has not successfully passed Key Performance Parameters 
(KPP’s) and Critical Operating Issues (COI’s) tests, and is still being fielded as a 
technology demonstration to end users.  
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MASI 
How well the MASI project did with progress measurement on a scale of 1-10  
(1= low, 10= high): 7 
Effect 
Schedule: MASI was a smaller project in scope and therefore easier to manage 
with respect to schedule.  There was a prototype to work from (MSHOPS) and the 
number of requirements identified for delivery was minuscule compared to that of 
WatchKeeper.  As such, the scheduling was realistic with end user priorities being the 
focus of delivery.  If the requirements were not a priority and an engineering possibility 
given time or technical skill, the requirement was pushed to a later iteration/deliverable.  
These issues were identified during the daily face-to-face meetings with stakeholders.   
Cost: the majority of the capabilities were delivered to the end-user within budget. 
Performance: the majority of the capabilities was delivered to the end-user and met the 
identified requirements.  
Stakeholder: I have broken down stakeholders into the following categories: trust 
among stakeholders, stakeholder professional experience, stakeholder proximity to each 
other geographically, stakeholder support of the project, and finally stakeholder turnover.  
Trust amongst stakeholders is vital for successful software development efforts.  There 
must be a genuine trust of each other so that key metrics of progress have validity.  
Professional experience with the stakeholder’s respective role is important to understand 
within a project so that adequate time can be allotted for training as necessary, and 
expectations can be managed with expected time to complete a task.  Obviously, the more 
experience a stakeholder has in their respective role, the less time would be needed for 
training and theoretically the more experience a stakeholder has, the quicker a task can be 
completed.  Stakeholder geographic proximity with each other affects the manner in 
which the stakeholders communicate, perform their respective tasks, and interact with 
each other. The closer the stakeholders are, the easier it is to perform these functions.  
Stakeholder Support of the project is critical. Without genuine support of all stakeholders 
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involved with the software development project, the project will be hampered. By 
support, I am not only referring to funding, but I am also referring to staffing, leadership 
support, belief in the project, and how the project will be integrated within into the 
overall enterprise of the organization. Finally, stakeholder (personnel) turnover reflects 
the impact of project stakeholders leaving a project and being replaced.  Stakeholder 
turnover happens for a myriad of reasons, and is especially prevalent within DoD and 
DHS given rotations, promotions, and changing priorities.  As such, the impact of this 
disruption must be realized, and the impact on the project’s progress must be understood.  
When new stakeholders are brought on to a project, this individual must be trained in the 
technology, the goals, and the overall strategy of the project. This adds time to the 
project. 
WatchKeeper 
How well the watchKeeper project did with the stakeholder variable on a scale of 
1 to 10 (1= low, 10= high):  
• Trust among stakeholders: 4 
• Stakeholder professional experience: 4 
• Stakeholder proximity to each other: 3 
• Stakeholder support of the project: 7 
• Stakeholder turnover: 3 (many stakeholders left the project) 
Effect 
Schedule: the lack of trust among stakeholders had a negative effect on the 
schedule. Stakeholders often withheld information from each other, including progress 
information and information about delays. The professional experience of stakeholders 
was fairly low. Both the sponsor and sponsors representative had no prior experience in 
their role prior to the WatchKeeper project. Developing the WatchKeeper system was 
also a first for the developers of the project. Although they had prior experience with 
system development, never had they taken a project on of this magnitude. The program 
manager of the project had experience with acquisition and program management, but 
never had the program manager been responsible for a project of this size. The 
inexperience of stakeholders had a negative effect on the schedule.  Stakeholders were 
 58 
geographically separated as mentioned earlier this thesis, and as such added a layer of 
complexity to many facets of the project. This geographical separation also had a 
negative effect on the schedule.  Stakeholder support of the project was relatively high. 
All of the stakeholders wanted the project to succeed, and all of the stakeholders realized 
the value of the project for the Coast Guard. Stakeholder support did not have a negative 
effect on the schedule. Stakeholder turnover for the project was high. As mentioned 
earlier in the thesis, roles and responsibilities were interchanged and stakeholders left the 
project for various reasons. As such, the new stakeholders coming into the project 
required time to come up to speed with the happenings of the effort. This had a negative 
effect on the project schedule. 
Cost: the above-mentioned stakeholder variables had a negative impact on the 
project, resulting in the cost being driven higher. 
Performance: the above-mentioned stakeholder variables had a negative impact 
on the project, resulting in reduced capabilities being delivered to the end-user. 
MASI 
How well the MASI project did with the stakeholder variable on a scale of 1 to 10 
(1= low, 10= high): 
• Trust among stakeholders: 9 
• Stakeholder professional experience: 5 
• Stakeholder proximity to each other: 7 
• Stakeholder support of the project: 9 
• Stakeholder turnover: 10 (no stakeholders left the project) 
Effect  
Schedule: of the above-mentioned stakeholder variables, the only variable that 
impacted the schedule in a negative way was stakeholder professional experience. The 
developers of the project had experience working with the technology being 
implemented, and the program manager of the effort was comfortable managing MASI 
project. The sponsor and sponsors representative were again relatively new to their 
respective roles, but given their experience gained from the WatchKeeper project, and the 
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high experience of the other stakeholders involved in the effort, the impact was minimal 
to the schedule. 
Cost: the MASI project was delivered within budget. 
Performance: the MASI project delivered the capabilities identified in the 
requirements. 
Communication: there are several forms of communication that I’m referring to. 
They are Formal (meetings, testing events, requirement generation), informal (elevator, 
water-cooler, lunches, etc), written (both official project documents and adhoc email for 
example), and team size. Regardless of the form, the communication must be open and 
available to all stakeholders. The final aspect of communication is team size.  As pointed 
out by Brooks, Jr., (1982, p. 18), “communication is made up of two parts, training and 
intercommunication.  Of the two, intercommunication is worse.  As tasks are separately 
coordinated, the effort of intercommunication increases n(n-1)/2.  For example, three 
workers require three times as much pairwise intercommunication as two; four requires 
six times as much as two, etc.”  Therefore, the more stakeholders that are involved, the 
more complex the communication variable becomes.   
WatchKeeper 
How well the WatchKeeper project did with the communication variable on a 
scale of 1-10 (1= low, 10= high):   
• Formal: 5 
• Informal: 7 
• Written: 3 
• Team size: 4 
Effect  
Schedule: of all of the communication variables mentioned above, the biggest 
detriment to the WatchKeeper project was with the written and team size variables. Given 
that the trust among stakeholders could have been stronger, there were many written 
communications that only reached certain stakeholders, and were purposefully withheld 
from others. This includes actual project memorandums that were not routed to certain 
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stakeholders for various reasons. Additionally, the team size of the project facilitated the 
gravitation into “cliques” amongst stakeholders.  These “cliques” shared emails and other 
items within their group, but not outside. Many of these communications related to the 
schedule, and because they weren’t open and available to all, the schedule was impacted. 
Cost: a lot of time was wasted given the lack of strong communication channels, 
and as such, the cost of the project was impacted negatively. 
Performance: again, given the lack of communication amongst stakeholders had a 
negative effect on the performance and functionality of the WatchKeeper project. 
MASI 
How well the MASI project did with the communication variable on a scale of 1 
to 10 (1= low, 10= high): 
• Formal: 7 
• Informal: 9 
• Written: 9 
• Team size: 9 
Effect 
Schedule: there was no negative impact on schedule because of communication 
within the MASI project. 
Cost: the MASI project was not negatively impacted because of the 
communication variables. 
Performance: given the frequent face-to-face meetings, and the small team size, 
any risks to the project were dealt with immediately and understood by all stakeholders. 
As such, communication had a positive impact on the delivery of capabilities to the end-
users. 
Rigidity of the development process being followed:  the appropriate development 
process that should be selected is dependent on the project needs.  For new technologies 
and uncharted efforts, flexibility is paramount. Obviously new technology requires more 
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time to understand, forecast, develop, and implement.  However, for more routine efforts, 
or for maintenance and support, standardized processes might be appropriate. 
WatchKeeper 
How well the WatchKeeper project with the rigidity variable on a scale of 1-10 
(1= low, 10= high):  3 
Effect 
Schedule: because of the required mandates of the MSAM and other acquisition 
policies, the WatchKeeper project was handcuffed in such a manner that tasks were being 
assigned just to “check the box”, despite little to no value being added to the overall 
success of the project. Many man/woman hours were wasted “checking the box”, and 
because stakeholders realized that these activities had no impact on the project, the 
motivation to complete these tasks were extremely low. Additionally, the technology was 
new to the developers of WatchKeeper, so there were many times that they were learning 
“on the fly”. However, the mandate of the acquisition process requires that project needs 
and engineering solution be identified upfront with little to no time for updating. Given 
the new technology and experience of the developers, it was almost impossible to clearly 
identify when capabilities would be delivered despite best efforts. These activities had a 
negative effect on the schedule of the project.  
Cost: the above-mentioned factors negatively impacted the costs of the project. 
Performance: given the technology challenges, many of the capabilities were not 
delivered as identified in the requirements. 
MASI 
How well the MASI project did with the rigidity variable on a scale of 1 to 10 (1= 
low, 10= high): 9 
Effect  
Schedule: the MASI project was not riddled with having to meet specific 
mandates. Although the SDLC was the guidance used for the effort, the project was given 
flexibility as to which sections with in the SDLC would be followed. If the stakeholders 
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felt that a certain function would add no value to the effort, it was skipped. This 
flexibility enabled stakeholders to focus on value added processes, and as such the 
schedule of the project was met. 
Costs: cost was not impacted with the process implemented to develop MASI. 
Performance: all capabilities were delivered as identified in the requirements, and 
the flexibility afforded to the stakeholders was a critical reason for this. 
Other factors: outside pressures refers to situations such as, political, time to 
develop the project (“this project has to be done by this date, no exceptions), etc.  The 
more of these variables that are introduced to the project, the more likely shortcuts are 
going to try to be taken. Shortcuts do not have a positive effect within the development 
effort, at worst, they lengthen the effort.  
WatchKeeper 
How well the WatchKeeper project did on a scale of 1-10 (1= low, 10= high):  5  
The WatchKeeper project had outside factors that impacted the project. For 
example, given the hierarchy of the stakeholders, there were political influences of the 
effort. Another critical factor that impacted the project was that the WatchKeeper project 
was classified as “too big to fail”, and as such, the true reality of progress was never 
ascertained or accepted.  
Effect 
Schedule: the “other” factors had a negative impact on the schedule of the project. 
Costs: the “other” factors had a negative impact on the schedule of the project. 
Performance: the “other” factors influenced the delivery of capabilities for the 
project and as such had a negative impact on the effort.   
MASI 
How well the MASI project did with the other factor variable on a scale of 1 to 10  
(1= low, 10= high): 7 
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The only “other” factor to impact the MASI project was the pressure to deliver 
something quickly so that MHSOPS could be taken off-line. This pressure was both 
negative and positive to the project effort. The negative aspect was the identified 
compressed timeline given to the project by leadership. The positive aspect of the “other” 
factors was that leadership was motivated to get MHSOPS off-line given the security risk 
it posed to the enterprise, and as such provided timely support as needed.  
Effect  
Schedule: the “other” factors had a positive impact on the schedule of the project 
given the reasons identified above. 
Costs: the “other” factors had a positive influence on the project as identified 
above.   
Performance: the “other” factors had a positive influence on the project as 
identified above. 
Table 6.   Aggregated totals of WatchKeeper and MASI relative scoring  WatchKeeper MASI 
5. Progress Measurement 76. 2 77. 7 














6. Communication . Formal 101.  102. 5 106.  107. 7 
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11. Rigidity  112. 3 113. 9 
14. Other Factors 115. 5 116. 9 
K. WATCHKEEPER AND MASI PROJECTS COMPARED TO AGILE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Table 6 shows both the MASI and WatchKeeper projects compared to Boehm and 
Turner’s (2004) theory of the five critical factors involved in determining the relative 
suitability of agile or plan-driven methods given a project situation.  The blue-shaded 
boxes reflect the plan-driven approach, while the green-shaded boxes reflect suitability 
more appropriate for agile methods.  As clearly identified by the table, the MASI project 
was better suited for an agile approach given the factors involved with the project, while 
the WatchKeeper project was almost split between plan-driven and agile given the factors 
involved. 
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Table 7.   The Five Critical Agility/Plan-Driven Factors: Comparison With 
WatchKeeper and MASI Projects (From Cockburn et al., 2005, p. 55) 
 WatchKeeper MASI  
Agile 
Plan Driven  
Size (Number of 
personnel on the 
team) 
Upwards of 20 
people 
6–8 people  Well matched to small 
products and teams. 
Reliance on tacit 
knowledge limits 
scalability. 
Methods evolved to 
handle large products 
and teams. Hard to 





in terms of 
comfort, money, 




 Untested on safety-
critical products. 
Potential difficulties with 
simple design and lack of 
documentation. 
Methods evolved to 
handle highly critical 
products. Hard to 












 Simple design and 
continuous re-factoring 
are excellent for highly 
dynamic environments 
but a source of 
potentially expensive 
rework for highly stable 
environments. 
Detailed plans and 
big design up-front 
are excellent for a 
highly stable 
environment, but a 
source of expensive 






defined in Table 
3) 
Low for the 
task at hand 
High  Requires continuous 
presence of critical mass 
of scarce Level 2 or 3 
experts (as defined 
earlier). Risky to use 
non-agile Level 1B 
people. 
Need for critical 
mass of scarce Level 
2 and 3 experts 
(defined earlier) 
during project 
definition but can 
work with fewer late 
in the project. Can 
usually accommodate 









The team was 
not designed to 
be flexible, nor 
did the team 
feel 




 Thrives in a culture 
where people feel 
comfortable and powered 
by having many degrees 
of freedom (thriving on 
chaos). 
Thrives in a culture 
where people feel 
comfortable and 
empowered by 
having their roles 




An interesting observation regarding the data in Table 6 is that the data reflected 
in the cells of the WatchKeeper and MASI projects are the actual values from each 
respective project for the corresponding variable in the row.  For example, the personnel 
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factor for the MASI project was high given the technical abilities of the project team, 
while for the WatchKeeper project, the personnel factor was low, given the abilities of 
WatchKeeper’s project team.  Given the technical challenges of the WatchKeeper project 
outlined earlier, this factor should have rated high as well, and as such would have 
switched that cell’s value to green suggesting that an agile approach would have been 
more appropriate.  The personnel factor was not the only factor that was in error for the 
WatchKeeper project.  The culture factor cell, which is a gauge of how many degrees of 
freedom the stakeholders have, should have been green as well for the WatchKeeper 
project, given the uncertainty of many of the variables, such as vague requirements and 
new technologies exploration.  As outlined in Chapter II, these types of variables are 
better suited for an agile approach, and as such, this box too would have been green, 
again suggesting that the WatchKeeper project should have used an agile approach, 





The primary objective of this thesis was to explore and understand factors that 
may have contributed to Coast Guard IT projects that have delivered late and or out of 
scope, by exploring and comparing two IT projects; WatchKeeper and MASI.  Agile 
software development was also examined, and a history and definitions of the various 
methodologies were explained and outlined.  Finally, case studies for both the 
WatchKeeper and MASI projects were outlined and the variables that led to the success 
or failure of the projects were explored.  The variables of the WatchKeeper and MASI 
projects were compared to agile system development, and an analysis was conducted to 
evaluate whether agile methodologies were suitable for IT projects of this kind.  Given 
this analysis, I believe that agile methodologies are quite suitable for IT projects within 
the DoD and DHS, and that agile development should be another tool that should be 
explored as an option when developing IT systems within the government.  I do not 
believe that agile system development is a silver bullet that will solve all software 
development challenges; it does, however, offer a refreshing approach to software 
development within the DoD and DHS. 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis focused primarily on the case studies of the WatchKeeper and MASI 
projects, and the variables involved with those two projects.  The thesis also focused on 
agile software development, the characteristics of the agile methodologies, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies.  Further research is required on the 
implementation of agile system development and how it can dovetail with the DoD 
acquisition process and other DoD acquisition mandates.  
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